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Introduction 
Medical writing on assessment of a patient's 
mental capacity, or competency, to make deci- 
sions about reatment tends to uncritically adopt 
an approach in which the doctor controls the 
timing and method of assessment. Such an 
approach has three main implications. First, it 
precludes or inhibits the patient'spower regard- 
ing his or her mental status. Secondly, it affects 
his or her decision-making capacity in respect of 
health care generally. Thirdly, it reinforces the 
unequal, but alterable, power relationship be- 
tween doctor and patient. 
The traditional approach to assessment of 
capacity reveals a limitation to the principle of 
self-determination, which is advanced by many 
commentators as the ethical purpose against 
which assessments of mental capacity are 
determined. Patients' interests in having their 
power and control over decision-making recog- 
nised, honoured and facilitated are not ade- 
quately protected by the principle of self- 
determination, or its close relation autonomy 
and the remaining principles in the hegemony of 
modem liberal bioethics; beneficence, non- 
maleficence, and justice (the 'Georgetown Man- 
tra'). A theory and practice of patient empower- 
ment is necessary to protect and promote 
substantial interests patients have over this 
aspect of decision-making. Empowerment may 
serve further, and different, interests in health 
care encounters. Empowerment recognises that 
prior to any ultimate decision regarding treat- 
ment for which a competent consent, or refusal, 
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is required, a patient can, in appropriate 
circumstances, have his or her ability to develop 
that capacity better fostered and protected by 
'Patients' interests in having their power and 
control over decision-making recognised, are 
not adequately protected by the principle of 
self-determination" 
respecting his or her power and control over 
essential aspects in the lead-up to and process of 
assessment. 
Traditional Purposes of Assessment 
At one level, the assessment ofcapacity serves to 
distinguish the mentally capable from the 
mentally incapable patient. The capable patient 
can thus exercise her freedom to choose whether 
or not to go through with treatment, and, if so, 
which of a range of options to prefer. Much of 
the writing on determination of mental capacity 
treats the standard of capacity as unproblematic 
and, thus, renders invisible the normative con- 
text and sociological implications of capacity 
assessment. In this literature, capacity is treated 
as constituting a self-evident either/or deter- 
mination or one where debate centres on narrow 
issues such as whether the patient is able to 
understand or actually understands. A deter- 
mination of capacity establishes an important 
contour point on the landscape of medical 
encounters. Since determinations of capacity to 
make decisions about health care and treatment 
are not made universally in all episodes with 
health care consequences but only when a 
person enters or is captured by the medical 
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system, the determination of capacity marks the 
person out from her social hinterland and 
signals a particular status in medical terms. This 
may have important individual, social, legal and 
medical consequences. 
While much discourse on assessment of 
mental capacity assumes a value-neutral base, 
a number of authors acknowledge that the 
assessment of capacity, specifically the standard 
of capacity, involves a normative issue. Amer- 
ican psychiatrists Appelbaum and Roth state 
that the standard ought to be determined by the 
policy-oriented goals one is seeking to attain: 
' . . .  [s]uch goals inevitably include a mixture 
of concerns relating to the societal values that 
we wish to implement and to the preferences 
we wish to confer in these values'. ~
Appelbaum and Roth describe several goals: 
autonomy, rational decision-making, benefi- 
cence, respect for persons, justice, encourage- 
ment of research, subject satisfaction, and test 
administration. Gillon, English disciple of the 
Georgetown Mantra in Britain, states ' . . . i t  
appears reasonable to argue that at least in 
democratic, and hence in principle autonomy 
respecting, societies there seems no good reason 
for doctors to establish any higher (or lower) 
standards of requisite autonomy than those set 
democratically'. 2 
A more detailed exegesis of the value pur- 
poses underpinning the standard of capacity is 
undertaken by Buchanan and Brock. 3 They 
advance two principal values as foundational 
to the standard of capacity: individual well- 
being and self-determination. Self-determination 
is posited for two reasons. First, it is instrumen- 
tally valuable in promoting a person's well- 
being. Secondly, it recognises that most people 
commonly want to make significant decisions 
about their lives for themselves because they 
believe that in most cases they are in a better 
position to decide what is best for themselves 
than others are. Beauchamp and Childress 
argue, however, that capacity is determined 
primarily by whether a person has the capacity 
to decide autonomously, and not by whether a 
person's best interests are protected. 4 
The medical ethics literature reveals a range of 
approaches to the doctor's role in the assessment 
of capacity. Beauchamp and Childress adopt a 
traditional biomedical model, in which incapa- 
city is viewed in terms of physical cause, 
restoration of which lies with the doctor through 
biophysical intervention: 
'... if a health professional has determined 
that a patient is not competent, he next step is
to inquire whether capacity can be restored. 
When incompetence rests on a reversible 
cause, such as pain or overmedication, the 
immediate goal is to restore capacity prior to 
decision-making' .4 
Such an approach locates power in the health 
professional by marking his or her authority 
over the determination, thus privileging his or 
her (biomedical) means of assistance, and defin- 
ing resolution in terms of medical professional 
knowledge rather than, or in addition to, 
patient-centred knowledge. 
Buchanan and Brock are among the few 
authors who espouse a doctor's duty to promote 
capacity. They write: 
'... [t]he attending physician is responsible for 
making every reasonable ffort to maximize 
the patient's competence (by appropriate 
control of medications, by improving the 
patient's ability to communicate through the 
use of special techniques or equipment where 
appropriate, and by making a sincere effort to 
provide relevant information to the patient in 
a manner which he or she can understand and 
evaluate and in a decision-making context 
which is supportive)'. 3 
Here, the emphasis is on the doctor controlling 
the process. Though the advice is couched in 
terms of the doctor improving the patient's 
ability and providing information in a support- 
ive context, the locus of power and direction 
resides in the doctor. 
Seedhouse offers a practical approach to 
autonomy in patient decision-making. 5,6 He 
emphasises the doctor's role in improving or 
enhancing (what he terms 'creating') autonomy. 
He defines autonomy as being 'able to do'. This 
is distinguished from 'respecting autonomy', 
which entails agreeing to fully reasoned choices 
of others. This occurs at a point which Seed- 
house calls the 'autonomy flip'. Until this point, 
he states, 'the health worker (it needn't be a 
doctor) does not judge that the subject has 
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sufficient autonomy to respect. Once the flip has 
occurred then the doctor is, normally, obliged to 
desist ...,7 The health worker's responsibility is, 
as soon as possible, to ensure that through the 
enablement process the person or group can take 
over. 7 
Seedhouse alludes to the relation between 
autonomy and power when he states that: 
'... [a] significant element in any true health 
care intervention will be to lessen impediment 
and to create power in the person who is 
being cared for'. s 
He develops this further elsewhere by noting 
that while 'a person with some degree of 
autonomy is able to control at least part of his 
world, the person without autonomy is power- 
less. "s He proposes that where there is a conflict 
between the need of the individual seeking 
"more health" and the health wo'tker genuinely 
attempting to create further autonomy, 'the way 
to resolve this is to assume that the individual 
has a clearer view of what will empower her 
than the health worker unless there are very 
good reasons to doubt this. '8 
A further are exception to the general trend is 
the recent British Medical Association/Law 
Society guidance on assessment of mental 
capacity. 9 The guidance states that it is the 
general duty of the assessing doctor to maximise 
capacity. It lists useful points relevant o this 
duty. These include treating any condition 
which affects capacity before a final assessment 
is made; minimising the impact of any mental 
disability (for example training a person with 
short-term memory deficit); choosing the best 
location and time for the assessment; and, 
educating the person being assessed as to the 
factors relevant o the proposed ecision. While 
this guidance has a patient-oriented, facilitative 
approach to assessment, i  remains bounded by 
a paternalist/beneficence model of the doctor- 
patient relationship. For instance, while it 
recommends that doctors choose the best loca- 
tion and time for the assessment, the patient's 
place in determining these matters is omitted, 
Medically established knowledge precludes pa- 
tient control over this aspect of decision-making. 
The guidance states: 
'... [i]n someone who is on the borderline of 
having capacity, anxiety may tip that person 
into incapacity. It may be appropriate to 
assess the person in his or her own home if 
it is thought that an interview at either a 
hospital or a GP's surgery would adversely 
affect the result'. 9
These truisms exclude an equally important, and 
necessary, source of knowledge---the patient. 
That the patient's knowledge is rendered in- 
visible by the guidance is further illustrated by 
its final comment that: 
'... [a] relative or carer may be able to indicate 
the most suitable location and time for the 
assessment' .9 
Thus, with regard to this important aspect of 
assessment, the patient's exclusion is complete. 
He or she becomes voiceless. 
"... this guidance remains bounded by a 
paternalist~beneficence model of th  
doctor-patient relationship" 
The BMA/Law Society guidance does, however, 
recommend at length the importance of the 
doctor educating the person being assessed as to 
the factors relevant o the proposed decision. 
Here, the doctor is enjoined to establish what the 
patient understands about the decision and re- 
explain, in writing if necessary, aspects of the 
decision which have not been fully grasped. This 
advice is consistent with the law on consent o 
medical treatment, though it appears to go 
further by recommending that the doctor check 
patient understanding and provide written 
clarification, if necessary. The BMA/Law Society 
advice locates decision-making power and con- 
trol in the doctor. There is, for example, no 
acknowledgement that the patient may question 
the assessment process or initiate comple- 
mentary or different modes of approaching the 
assessment. 
To summarise, the literature on assessment of
mental capacity reinforces the power and control 
of the doctor over the patient, although Seed- 
house disavows physical control and maintains 
that a health worker's enablement of autonomy 
cedes at the 'autonomy flip'--when the person or 
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group can then take over. This general reinforce- 
ment of power and control in the literature is so 
whether the issue of assessment is treated as 
value-neutral or normative. Those authors who 
analyse capacity in normative terms locate the 
determination against raditional principles; self- 
determination, autonomy, and well-being. The 
literature on capacity shows that even when there 
is resort to such principles, patients are effec- 
tively denied a voice over key elements in a 
capacity assessment, including location and 
timing. The formal goals of self-determination-- 
promotion of patient autonomy and choice can 
be seen to break down in the literature and 
guidance on capacity assessments. 
"... patients are effectively denied a voice over 
key dements in a capacity assessment' 
A fresh approach is required. The concept of 
empowerment is attractive. It represents an 
effective means by which to complement the 
benefit o patients afforded through the princi- 
ple of self-determination a d associated facets of 
the various meanings of autonomy. It would 
also catalyse the latent power of a linguistically 
open term such as self-determination, much in 
the same way as rights discourse in the USA has 
advanced actual patient rights in decision- 
making. 1° More importantly, a theory and 
practice of empowerment acknowledges the 
unequal power relationship in the doctor- 
patient relationship and locates greater control 
and power in the patient. While there will 
remain circumstances in which the patient is 
deemed incompetent to make decisions about 
medical treatment, in these cases the doctor or 
appropriate proxy decision-maker will continue 
to make decisions in the patient's best interests. 
The application of the concept of empowerment 
respects the patient's ability to develop his or 
her ultimate functioning, aided where necessary 
by medical, social and personal resources. 
Patient Empowerment 
Generally, the term and practice of empower- 
ment exists across a range of fields, principally 
mental health advocacy, I1 and within distinct 
organisations, particularly nursing 12 and social 
work. 13 However, its usages within these fields 
and organisations reveals a term whose pur- 
poses and applications are invariably proble- 
matic and sometimes contradictory./4 Servian, 
for instance, proposes that empowerment occurs 
where individuals are able to follow their own 
interests, to feel fulfilment or to meet their own 
material needs. 15 This appears to be insufficient. 
Such a definition might equally connote liberty 
or freedom--quite different concepts to empow- 
erment. Moreover, controversy surrounds the 
issue of who would empower. Some nursing 
literature, for example, uncritically assumes that 
nurses can empower the patient. 16 This claim is 
advanced espite substantial sociological litera- 
ture on the different roles of nurse and patient, 
and in particular, the professional and institu- 
tional constraints experienced by nurses in their 
relationship with their patients. Such a claim by 
nurses also assumes that empowerment is 
appropriately effected by health care providers. 
Many patients, consumers or clients within the 
health care sector challenge the idea of profes- 
sional control over the process of empowerment. 
Empowerment: Theoretical Starting Points 
The term 'empowerment' is adopted in this 
paper as a response to the unequal power 
relations in society generally, with particular 
reference in the present context o the disequili- 
brium of power between medicine (understood 
as medical knowledge and professional practice) 
"... "'empowerment'" is a response to the 
unequal power relations in society generally" 
and health care patients, clients or consumers. It
draws from wider sociological attempts to 
understand professional occupations in terms 
of their power relations in society 17 and in terms 
of authority to construct modes of medical 
knowledge./8 This theoretical approach would 
be open to seeing individuals as having some 
ability to apply power rather than to see 
individuals in health care encounters, a  Lukes 19 
and Foucault 2° might suggest, as necessarily 
victims of other people's power, is 
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Empowerment and Capacity 
My focus on capacity is an attempt to isolate one 
of the events in doctor-patient relations where 
power issues are at stake. In this context 
empowerment starts from acknowledging 
power relations, honouring a patient's actual 
and/or potential power in decision-making, and 
respects a patient's exercise of greater control 
over the process of assessment. Control here 
does not mean domination. Rather, it conveys 
effective involvement and authority in com- 
munication and decision-making. Control is 
not necessarily equivalent o an autonomous 
decision to consent o or refuse medical treat- 
ment. It is embedded in a process rather than an 
isolated event. It may serve as a vehicle by 
which an autonomous decision on a proposed 
treatment or series of treatments i achieved. It 
can be viewed, to paraphrase from the psycho- 
logical literature on self-control: 
'as a process through which an individual 
becomes the principal agent in guiding, 
directing, and regulating those features of 
his [sic] own behavior that might eventually 
lead to desired positive consequences. "21 
Roberts et al treat powerlessness in the health 
care encounter as an absence of control. In their 
study of the effects on a small sample of patients 
of negotiated and non-negotiated nurse-patient 
interactions, they found that subjects in the 
negotiated group expressed greater perceptions 
of control over decisions occurring within the 
interaction than did subjects engaged in a non- 
negotiated approach. The feeling of control was 
a function of the interactive approach with the 
caregiver, and not based on subject personality 
alone. While the study did not show that the 
perception of empowerment affected agreement 
with treatment, he authors uggest that studies 
may show that nurses could, by increasing 
patient's responsibility for and involvement in 
their treatment, be instrumental in improving 
patient compliance and satisfaction. 22Empower- 
ment would seek to address the complexity of 
psychological factors implicated in decision- 
making which arise from, and could be reme- 
died through, the dynamics of power. For 
instance, learned helplessness theory casts light 
on the inhibition of human action through 
historical explanation of lack of control and 
negative consequences following attempts to 
gain control. 23 As Servian points out, this may 
be relevant o empowerment when: 
'... [c]arers and users in many cases may feel 
stigrnatised by historically unresponsive and 
uncontrollable services'. 15 
This may affect patients" requests for support 
and their decision-making ability generally. An 
empowerment approach would seek to respond 
to the patient's sense of powerlessness by 
addressing these psychological (as well as 
structural) inhibitors. Conventional doctrine on 
self-determination a d patient autonomy tends 
not to do so, though in fairness it should be 
added that modem conceptions of self- 
determination and respect for autonomy in 
medical ethics generally did not attempt o do 
more than secure limited, though laudable, 
objectives for patient decision-making. 24 
"An empowerment approach would respond to 
the patient's sense of powerlessness by 
addressing these psychological and 
structural inhibitors" 
This awareness of the complexity of decision- 
making reflects recent developments in action 
theory. While different meanings are attached to 
action theory, a common denominator reveals an 
aim to analyse human action broadly, in 
response to the historically narrow approaches 
of philosophers, jurists and psychologists, parti- 
cularly behaviourists. 25,26,27 It incorporates ex- 
amination of volition, intention, goals, means, 
potential consciousness and responsibility; 2s 
informed, though not necessarily jointly, by 
sociological, psychological 29and philosophicaP ° 
perspectives. In addition to its sensibility to 
complexity, it is relevant o the present discus- 
sion because some of its proponents explicitly 
acknowledge the importance of addressing the 
issue of power in decision-making both at an 
individual evel 31 and in terms of social action. 32 
Empowerment also goes beyond the atomistic 
individualism of self-determination a d patient 
autonomy by recognising the need for indivi- 
duals to have access to resources, including 
affective support, needed to effect heir own 
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control. 33 Internally, the patient experiencing 
disrupted capacity may need to adjust and find 
a new, or re-establish a familiar, centre from 
which to make clear, autonomous choices. 
Externally, the patient may need to control 
influences on capacity. For instance, Alderson 
observes in the context of children--a group 
traditionally assumed to be incompetent--that 
some facing surgery used patient-controlled 
analgesia pumps or practised their own hyp- 
notherapy, which 'literally put the child in 
charge'. 34 Old people, disillusioned with con- 
ventional medicine and health care, have 
achieved improvements in self-care decision- 
making through empowering initiatives uch as 
peer health counselling, advocacy and support 
groups for Alzheimer's ufferers. 35 
Crucially, however, the aim of empowerment 
is mediated by the need to respect each patient's 
well-being and long-term autonomy. At least 
from the perspective of allegiance to profes- 
sional codes and avoidance of liability, the 
doctor who intends to respect a patient's power 
in the lead up to and process of ultimate 
assessment of capacity regarding treatment 
would need to be satisfied that the patient is 
mentally capable of doing so. Empowerment, 
therefore, acts on and fosters autonomy while 
also respecting patients' greater control over the 
process of assessment. 
Empowerment: Beyond Self-determination 
and Autonomy 
A range of meanings have been given to the 
term autonomy. Gerald Dworkin summarises 
this diversity well: 
' . . .  "autonomy" is used in an exceedingly 
broad fashion. It is used sometimes as an 
equivalent of liberty...sometimes as an 
equivalent o self-rule or sovereignty, some- 
times as identical with freedom of the will. It 
is equated with dignity, integrity, individual- 
ity, independence, responsibility, and self- 
knowledge. It is identified with qualities of 
self-assertion, with critical reflection, with 
freedom from obligation, with absence of 
external causation, with knowledge of one's 
own interests...It is related to actions, to 
beliefs, to reasons for acting, to rules, to the 
will of other persons, to thoughts, and to 
principles. About the only features held 
constant from one author to another are that 
autonomy is a feature of persons and that it is 
a desirable quality to have. '36 
Hill takes a more systematic approach. 24 He 
distinguishes between distinct, though related 
forms of autonomy, including the germinal 
sense in which Kant used it in his Groundwork 
on the Metaphysics of Morals as a property of the 
will of rational beings to act in accord with 
principles. Hill also refers to Sartrean autonomy, 
to the sense of autonomy as the ideal rational 
life, and to the modern concepts of autonomy as 
a psychological capacity and as a right. A hybrid 
of Kantian and the latter two concepts inform 
the more recent bioethical constructions of 
autonomy by Veatch, 37 Beauchamp and 
Childress, 38 and Gillon. 2 The osmosis of bioethi- 
cal discourse into law has further altered the 
meaning of autonomy and brought it closer to, if 
not sometimes ynonymous with, doctrine on 
self-determination. 39 As such it is reduced to a 
right, principally to refuse treatment, if the 
criteria for autonomous decision-making are 
satisfied. Generally, these are understanding, 
belief and choice. 4° Seedhouse rejects what he 
sees as a narrow conventional view of autono- 
my. s He advances a position on autonomy as an 
intrinsic quality of people. Seedhouse spouses 
'creating autonomy' and acknowledges the place 
of power in enabling autonomy. The literature 
generally on autonomy, however, does not 
address power, in particular the dynamics of 
power as this affects the patient's decision- 
making process, and autonomous choices. 
Empowerment also goes beyond the narrow 
focus on rationality in the discourse on self- 
determination and patient autonomy by recog- 
nising the person's power in respect of cognitive 
and effective functioning. Such empowerment 
serves to facilitate each person's individual 
fulfilment, with wider implications than that 
suggested by rational choice. As Feste notes, 'the 
empowerment model speaks of self awareness, 
personal responsibility, informed choices, and 
quality of life'. 41 The reference to 'personal 
responsibility' does not, however, abandon the 
patient to looking after herself alone. An 
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important dimension to empowerment is that it 
fosters knowledge of, and reliance on, self in 
relation to the interdependence of all resources, 
human and other. Patient autonomy and self- 
determination on the other hand historically 
favour individualism and privilege. 
The development of self-awareness and the 
process of taking control is consistent with the 
notion of self-help, and is indeed often conflated 
with empowerment. Empowerment loses its 
political edge, however, if it is seen only as 
another form of self-help or enablement. 42 While 
the ends of empowerment may share some 
relations with self-help, aradical and vital aspect 
of empowerment lies in its recognition of the 
power relations between doctors and patients. 
Even recognition alone is less effective than 
empowered action. 43 
Group and Social Empowerment 
Much of the literature on empowerment em- 
phasises empowerment at a number of social 
levels of interaction and action. Athena McLean, 
while noting the operation of empowerment a
an individual evel, also identifies three further 
levels: (a) group--involving self-help and mu- 
tual aid; (b) organisational---effecting change in 
the social community; and, (c) consumer-- 
securing greater funding and promoting advo- 
cacy. 44 Action at all these levels may help to 
effect patient empowerment in respect of capa- 
city assessments. Consumer action, through, for 
example, representative groups such as the 
National Association for Mental Health (MIND), 
can help in altering the power relations between 
medical professionals and patients by influen- 
cing legislation (as was the case with the Mental 
Health Act 1983 in England and Wales) and by 
promoting the confidence of, and resources for, 
patients and users of mental health services. 
Group meetings may be a particularly useful 
method for empowerment in institutional 
settings, such as residential homes, where lack 
of extra-institutional stimulation, traditional 
ageist attitudes, and a relative absence of 
independent support from consumer organisa- 
tions impedes the actualisation of individual 
and collective power. Ward and Mullender 
advance self-directed group-work as a powerful 
facilitation of empowerment. 45 They note that 
with the focus on the individual the weight is 
too strongly distributed in favour of individual 
uniqueness and private troubles. They state that 
a number of distinctive benefits follow from self- 
directed group-work. Personal troubles can 
be translated into common concerns. Group 
"Group meetings may be a particularly useful 
method for empowerment i  institutional 
settings" 
solidarity engenders strength and dissolves 
previous apathy. A range of voices offer, and 
foster, alternative explanations, options for 
change and improvement. Self-directed group- 
work can also lend itself to an anti-oppressive 
style of working from which participants have 
an experiential base to challenge oppressive 
practice. Rappaport, writing about mental 
health, suggests that individually oriented inter- 
ventions may actually impede their allegedly 
empowering mission in so far as their limited 
expectations reduce the self-esteem of indivi- 
duals and increase their feelings of worthless- 
ness and despair. 46 He calls for a wider view of 
empowerment that is sensitive to the various 
contexts in which a person is found over time. 
Group empowerment may be particularly 
important among social or cultural groups who 
experience their power with an emphasis on the 
collective rather than on the individual. Profes- 
sional or institutional practices which effectively 
remove such peoples from their social network 
can disempower them, with resulting harmful 
effects on functioning and, in particular, on 
decision-making capacity. In the context of 
children's capacity, Alderson challenges the 
traditional Piagetian approach to cognitive de- 
velopment whose unconscious influence perme- 
ates much discussion about competency. She 
states: 
' . . .  [c]ompetence is more than a skill, it is a 
way of relating and can be understood more 
clearly when each child's inner qualities are 
seen within a network of relationships and 
cultural influences'. 34
Alderson states that some of the one hundred 
and twenty 8-15-year-old hospital patients in 
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her survey on capacity wanted to be the main 
decider, some wanted to share in decision- 
making, while others wanted their parents and 
doctors to make decisions for them. 
Patient empowerment may be informed by 
methods of long-term enhancement of capacity. 
McLaughlin refers to the Jean Vanier-inspired 
L'Arche residences in which people with learn- 
ing difficulties hare their lives with others, with 
(mutual) advances in capacity. 47 McLaughlin 
notes that it often takes years for people with 
learning difficulties to overcome the accumu- 
lated toll of institutionalisation a d over protec- 
tion but that when it happens, they begin to 
engage once more in trial and error learning and 
make substantial gains in functioning ability and 
competence. 
Patient empowerment will, no doubt, be 
enhanced if accepted by health care providers 
and supported independently of the health care 
system. Independent support is increasingly 
provided by advocacy workers committed to 
principles of empowerment in mental health. 
Health care providers are also increasing the 
scope of independent patient advocacy in hospi- 
tals. The legal protection of patient's interests and 
rights in medical decision-making may also serve 
to empower the patient. Recent ground-breaking 
legislation regarding consent o medical treat- 
ment in Ontario, Canada, is particularly relevant 
to the current discussion of capacity. The legisla- 
tion establishes a framework within which 
advocates are proposed to defend and advocate 
the interests of persons in community and 
institutional contexts. It also provides, including 
reference to determinations of capacity, certain 
rights of notification, entitlement to a rights 
advisor, and review. 48 Elsewhere, advocacy is 
advanced as a valuable resource in empowering 
patients and users of health services. 49 
"... espousal of a catch-all concept of 
empowerment which fails to account for 
disparities in class, race, gender and education 
will privilege some patients over others" 
However, espousal of an apparently catch-all 
concept of empowerment which fails to account 
for disparities according to class, race, gender 
and education will privilege some patients over 
others, thus reinforcing social inequities. More- 
over, that assessment of capacity may be biased 
or impaired by culturally determined i eas of 
illness or intelligence and by communication 
difficulties between participants with different 
ethnic or cultural backgrounds 5° suggests the 
need for context-sensitive empowering strate- 
gies. For instance, group encounters among 
similarly affected individuals can raise con- 
sciousness about, and action in response to, 
such specific power issues in medicine. 
Conclusion 
Traditional medical writing on patients' capa- 
city to make decisions reinforces the unequal 
power relation between doctors and patients. 
This is most clearly shown by medical control 
over the general process of assessment, parti- 
cularly timing and location. When commenta- 
tors discuss capacity within a context of 
normative principles, the main principles, 
namely self-determination, patient autonomy 
and well-being, do not address power at all, 
or, if they do, do so insufficiently. 
Patients' interests in having greater control 
over the process of capacity assessment are 
substantial and pressing. A determination of 
incapacity can not only carry a social stigma and 
injury to self-esteem, sl but may also leave an 
individual feeling angry and resentful, s2parti- 
cularly where he or she feels denied the 
opportunity to take responsibility and control 
in the process of assessment. 
While amendment o principles of self- 
determination and patient autonomy and con- 
cepts such as self-help and enablement may go 
some way towards alleviating the problems 
surrounding self-actualisation, only the theory 
and practice of empowerment challenges and 
offers solutions to the power and control of the 
medical professional over decision-making. This 
is illustrated in the context of assessment of 
capacity by advocating that patients exercise 
greater control and responsibility over the 
timing, location and use of resources (material, 
emotional and social). Such power can be 
facilitated at a number of levels: individual, 
group, organisational and consumer. Some 
writers believe that empowerment must be 
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taken and cannot be granted. Realistically, 
however, the success of any theory and practice 
of empowerment in medicine requires accep- 
tance from medical professionals as much as 
patients, not least because courts tend to rely on 
medical opinion in adjudications about capacity. 
Dermot Feenan 
County Down, Northern Ireland 
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